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2 
 
Maranna J. Meehan, Esq. 
Federal Community Defender Office for the  
Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
601 Walnut Street 
The Curtis Center, Suite 540 West 
Philadelphia, PA 19106 
  Counsel for Appellant 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.  
 Appellant Amin De Castro challenges the District 
Court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence and 
statements obtained by a police officer during a street 
encounter, arguing that he was unreasonably seized when the 
officer asked him to remove his hands from his pockets.  
Discerning no error in the District Court’s finding that the 
officer’s request was not a seizure, we will affirm the judgment 
of conviction entered on April 12, 2017.    
  
3 
 
I. 
 During the early evening hours of September 22, 2014, 
an anonymous source called 911 to report a Hispanic male 
pointing a gun at juveniles outside a vacant flower shop on the 
1800 block of North 31st Street in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  
The suspect was reportedly wearing a gray shirt, gray pants, 
and a bucket hat.  Philadelphia Police Officer John 
Mulqueeney, who had been assigned to that area for 
approximately thirteen years and knew about the drug and 
firearm activity prevalent there, was dispatched minutes after 
the call was placed.  He stopped his cruiser approximately 
fifteen to twenty feet from De Castro and his neighbor, who 
were speaking outside of the vacant flower shop.  De Castro 
was wearing a light gray bucket hat, a gray striped shirt, and 
gray camouflage pants.   
 As Officer Mulqueeney exited his car and approached 
the men, De Castro turned toward Officer Mulqueeney.  “At a 
distance of approximately [five to ten] feet, Officer 
Mulqueeney used a polite, conversational, and non-threatening 
tone to ask De Castro if he would remove his hands from his 
pockets.”  (App. at 11.)  De Castro complied, revealing a green 
pistol grip protruding from his pants pocket.  Officer 
Mulqueeney asked De Castro to raise his hands higher, and 
removed a loaded firearm from De Castro’s pocket.  When 
asked if he had identification or a permit to carry the firearm, 
De Castro replied that he had neither, but that he had a passport 
from the Dominican Republic.  Officer Mulqueeney 
handcuffed De Castro and frisked him, finding in De Castro’s 
pocket a loaded magazine containing ammunition that matched 
the firearm.  Additional officers arrived on-scene as Officer 
Mulqueeney placed De Castro under arrest.        
4 
 
Following a trial, De Castro was convicted of being an 
alien in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(5)(A).  The District Court, however, granted him a new 
trial “due to [his] trial counsel’s constitutionally deficient 
representation.”  (App. at 11.)  Pending his new trial, De Castro 
filed a motion to suppress all statements and physical evidence 
obtained by Officer Mulqueeney during the September 22, 
2014, encounter, contending that the stop was unconstitutional.   
After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the District 
Court determined that Officer Mulqueeney’s request for De 
Castro to remove his hands from his pockets did not constitute 
a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.  The District Court 
opined that Officer Mulqueeney, who responded to the scene 
alone, “neither ordered nor repeatedly asked De Castro to 
comply.  Instead, he used a polite, conversational, and non-
threatening tone to communicate his single request from a 
distance of at least five feet, with his weapon holstered and 
without any physical touching.”  (App. at 13.)  The Court thus 
concluded that De Castro was not seized at that moment 
because “a reasonable person would have felt free to decline 
Officer Mulqueeney’s lone request.”  (Id.)  Moreover, even 
assuming, arguendo, that the request was a seizure, the District 
Court nonetheless found that it was supported by reasonable 
suspicion.1  As such, the District Court denied De Castro’s 
suppression motion, and De Castro subsequently pled guilty to 
the offense.  He was sentenced to time served plus a two-year 
term of supervised release, and was then deported to the 
Dominican Republic.  He timely appealed.            
                                              
1 Since we conclude that the request was not a seizure, 
we need not address the question of whether there was 
reasonable suspicion.  
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II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3231, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Since 
the District Court’s factual findings are not in dispute, our 
review is plenary.  United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 458 
(3d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). 
III. 
The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  We have 
observed, however, that “not every interaction between a 
police officer and a citizen is protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.”  United States v. Smith, 575 F.3d 308, 312 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  Rather, “[p]olice encounters with citizens fall into 
one of three broad categories, each with varying degrees of 
constitutional scrutiny: ‘(1) police-citizen exchanges involving 
no coercion or detention; (2) brief seizures or investigatory 
detentions; and (3) full-scale arrests.’”  United States v. Brown, 
765 F.3d 278, 288 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. 
Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 777 (11th Cir. 2006)).   
Analyzing whether a police encounter in the second 
category comported with the Fourth Amendment requires a 
two-step inquiry: “Was there in fact a seizure?  If so, was that 
seizure reasonable?”  Smith, 575 F.3d at 313.  Regarding the 
first step, the Supreme Court has observed:  
[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the 
Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an 
individual on the street or in another public 
place, by asking him if he is willing to answer 
some questions, by putting questions to him if 
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the person is willing to listen, or by offering in 
evidence in a criminal prosecution his voluntary 
answers to such questions . . . . The person 
approached, however, need not answer any 
question put to him; indeed, he may decline to 
listen to the questions at all and may go on his 
way . . . . If there is no detention—no seizure 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment—
then no constitutional rights have been infringed. 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983) (plurality 
opinion) (internal citations omitted).2   
The Supreme Court elaborated on this holding one year 
later in Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Delgado, 
stating: 
our recent decision in Royer . . . plainly implies 
that interrogation relating to one’s identity or a 
request for identification by the police does not, 
by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure 
. . . . While most citizens will respond to a police 
request, the fact that people do so, and do so 
                                              
2 Notably, the Court in Royer concluded that asking 
Royer to produce his airline ticket and driver’s license “were 
no doubt permissible in themselves,” but that a seizure was 
thereafter effected “when the officers identified themselves as 
narcotics agents, told Royer that he was suspected of 
transporting narcotics, and asked him to accompany them to 
the police room, while retaining his ticket and driver’s license 
and without indicating in any way that he was free to depart      
. . . .”  Royer, 460 U.S. at 501. 
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without being told they are free not to respond, 
hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the 
response . . . . Unless the circumstances of the 
encounter are so intimidating as to demonstrate 
that a reasonable person would have believed he 
was not free to leave if he had not responded, one 
cannot say that the questioning resulted in a 
detention under the Fourth Amendment.    
  466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984).3   
Police conduct rises to the level of a “seizure” when, 
“by means of physical force or a show of authority, [a person’s] 
freedom of movement is restrained.”  United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-55 (1980) (holding that agents’ 
requests for an individual to produce her plane ticket and 
identification, “without more, did not amount to an intrusion 
upon any constitutionally protected interest”).  “Only when 
such restraint is imposed is there any foundation whatever for 
invoking constitutional safeguards.”  Id. at 553.  “[T]he test for 
existence of a ‘show of authority’ is an objective one: not 
whether the citizen perceived that he was being ordered to 
restrict his movement, but whether the officer’s words and 
actions would have conveyed that to a reasonable person.”  
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991) (citation 
omitted).  A person is thus “seized” when he or she yields to 
the show of authority.  Id. at 626.   
                                              
3 In Delgado, the Court ruled that questioning workers 
inside a factory about their citizenship status while 
immigration agents were stationed at the factory’s exits did not 
effectuate a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.  
Delgado, 466 U.S. at 219-20.   
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Factors tending to indicate a seizure include “the 
threatening presence of several officers, the display of a 
weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of 
the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating 
that compliance with the officer’s request might be 
compelled.”  Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.  Compare Brown, 
765 F.3d at 289 (holding that “[t]here was nothing about the 
detectives’ brief initial approach that constituted a Fourth 
Amendment seizure” when the detectives “did not activate 
their lights or sirens, brandish their weapons, block [the 
defendant’s] path, physically touch [the defendant], or make 
any threats or intimidating movements”), and Smith, 575 F.3d 
at 314 (holding that an individual was not seized when an 
officer repeatedly asked the question, “Where is your girl’s 
house?” because “[t]here was no overt indication the 
questioning was not part of a consensual encounter between 
the officer and [the individual]”), with United States v. Brown, 
448 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that an individual 
was “seized” when he turned and placed his hands on the police 
vehicle after the officer told him “that a robbery victim was 
being brought over to identify [him and another individual] as 
possible suspects and, if they were not identified, they would 
be free to go—necessarily implying that they were not free to 
leave”), and Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 205-06 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (finding that “it became clear that [the individual] 
could not refuse [the officer’s repeated] requests” to roll down 
his car window, and was thus seized).    
To determine whether Officer Mulqueeney’s request 
constituted a seizure, the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals’ decision in United States v. Barnes, 496 A.2d 1040 
(D.C. 1985), is instructive.  There, an officer was patrolling a 
high crime area when he observed Appellee Keith Barnes 
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standing outside a men’s clothing store, peering up and down 
the street, while another individual went in and out of the store 
a few times.  Barnes, 496 A.2d at 1041.  The officer, finding 
their behavior to be “suspicious,” approached and asked 
Barnes to remove his hands from his pockets.  Id.  Barnes 
complied and voluntarily answered the officer’s question about 
his reason for being there (“just hanging around”), and any 
prior arrests (previously arrested for armed robbery).  Id.  The 
officer then “observed a bulge in the stomach area of 
[Barnes’s] windbreaker which ‘looked unusual.’”  Id.   After 
feeling the bulge and suspecting it was a gun, the officer asked 
Barnes to place his hands on the police car and then removed a 
revolver from Barnes’s jacket.  Id.  Barnes was arrested on 
weapons charges, and subsequently moved to suppress the gun 
and ammunition seized by the officer.  Id.  The trial court ruled 
in Barnes’s favor, concluding that “the facts did not ‘justify a 
suspicion sufficient to stop [Barnes] and to conduct a search.’”  
Id.   
On appeal, the Court of Appeals addressed the 
“threshold question of . . . [w]hen did the seizure occur?”  Id. 
at 1042.  If it occurred at the moment when Barnes was asked 
to take his hands out of his pockets, then a Fourth Amendment 
violation had been committed because the police did not then 
have reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity was 
afoot.  It was only after Barnes answered that he was “just 
hanging around” and had a prior arrest for armed robbery, 
coupled with the observations the officer had made of Barnes’s 
companion repeatedly entering and exiting a store, that the 
officer had the requisite reasonable suspicion to effectuate “an 
investigatory detention and protective frisk.”  Id. at 1045.  As 
to the status of the encounter before the officer conducted the 
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frisk, the Court of Appeals held that was “consensual,” 
explaining: 
Officer Clark’s request that [Barnes] remove his 
hands from his pockets (which was no more 
intrusive than a request for identification), 
followed by two questions and [Barnes’s] 
“voluntary answers,” . . . met the Supreme Court 
test for a pre-seizure, “consensual encounter.” 
There are no indications of “intimidating” 
circumstances . . . . Officer Turner remained in 
the car while Officer Clark alone approached 
[Barnes]. Clark did not touch [Barnes] or draw a 
gun. Clark’s requests that [Barnes] remove his 
hands from his pockets and answer two questions 
were nonintimidating; there was no threatening 
language or any indication that Clark used a 
severe tone of voice. In short, nothing 
happened—under Supreme Court analysis—that 
would have warranted [Barnes’s] reasonable 
belief that he was not free to ignore the questions 
and walk away. 
Id. at 1045 (citations omitted).  Accordingly, the Court of 
Appeals reversed the trial court order suppressing the evidence 
obtained as a result of the protective frisk.  Id. 
 It is further instructive to note that many state courts to 
have reviewed the issue have likewise determined that an 
officer’s request that a person take their hands out of their 
pockets is not alone sufficient to convert an otherwise 
voluntary encounter into a seizure.  See, e.g., State v. Jennings, 
99 P.3d 1145, 1150 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004) (“We . . . find that 
the request for the men to remove their hands from their 
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pockets did not turn this voluntary encounter into a seizure.”); 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.4(a) (5th ed. 2012) 
(citations omitted) (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 
435 (1991)) (noting that a seizure does not occur “‘as long as 
the police do not convey a message that compliance with [a] 
request is required,’ and the same is true of a request that the 
suspect remove his hands from his pockets”).  Indeed, although 
not at issue here, many courts have applied this rationale to 
instances in which the officer does so in the form of a direction 
rather than a request.  See, e.g., United States v. Broomfield, 
417 F.3d 654, 656 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that an officer did 
not seize the defendant where, before asking him a question, 
“[a]ll that the officer had said was take your hands out of your 
pockets, an obvious precaution since it was dark and an armed 
robber was on the loose”); State v. Walker, 764 S.E.2d 804, 
806 (Ga. 2014) (finding that defendant “was not seized within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment by [officer’s] direction 
that he remove his hands from his pockets”) (emphasis in 
original); State v. Fortun-Cebada, 241 P.3d 800, 805 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 2010) (“[W]e conclude the direction to remove [a 
person’s] hands from his sweatshirt pocket did not convert a 
permissible social contact into a seizure.”).  Courts have further 
recognized that officers routinely make such requests for their 
own safety and not necessarily for investigative purposes.  See, 
e.g., State v. Hamilton, 36 So. 3d 209, 214 (La. 2010) (holding 
that police officers’ “instruction to remove [the defendant’s] 
hands from his pocket . . . was based on concerns for officer 
safety and did not communicate an intent to stop, seize, or 
search the defendant”); State v. Nettles, 855 P.2d 699, 712 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that “it is not unreasonable to 
permit a police officer in the course of an otherwise permissive 
encounter to ask an individual to make his hands visible”). 
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With this analysis in mind, we turn to the encounter 
between De Castro and Officer Mulqueeney.  De Castro urges 
us to find that Officer Mulqueeney’s request was a seizure, 
contending that Officer Mulqueeney made a show of authority 
by arriving in his patrol car, “immediately focusing on [De 
Castro] and walking toward him, . . . asking him to take his 
hands out of his pockets.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 13.)  While De 
Castro acknowledges Officer Mulqueeney’s “conversational 
tone,” he nonetheless argues that “even a polite request for 
someone to take his hands out of his pockets constitutes a show 
of authority if a reasonable person would not feel free to 
refuse.”  (Id.)  De Castro also makes a public policy argument 
based on the recent history of police encounters resulting in 
death, arguing that “[a] reasonable person in [his] shoes would 
have been well aware of the many tragic stories suggesting that 
failing to comply with a police officer’s request – especially 
conveying a threat by refusing to show hands – can end in 
death.”  (Id. at 19.)         
We reject De Castro’s arguments in light of the 
Mendenhall factors and Barnes.  Officer Mulqueeney was the 
only officer present during the initial encounter, and made a 
sole, polite, and conversational request for De Castro to 
remove his hands from his pockets, rather than an order for him 
to show his hands.  No weapons were drawn, and no threats 
were made.  Officer Mulqueeney did not communicate to De 
Castro—either through words or actions—that he was not free 
to leave.  Rather, it was appropriate for Officer Mulqueeney to 
request that De Castro remove his hands from his pockets for 
the safety of himself and others.  See Rodriguez v. United 
States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1616 (2015) (recognizing the 
governmental interest in officer safety during traffic stops, 
which are “especially fraught with danger to police officers” 
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(quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009))); 
Broomfield, 417 F.3d at 656 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that, in 
the midst of a robbery investigation, an officer’s request for an 
individual to remove his hands from his pockets did not 
constitute a seizure because the request was “an obvious 
precaution since it was dark and an armed robber was on the 
loose”).  And finally, the totality of the circumstances indicates 
that a reasonable person in De Castro’s position would have 
felt free to ignore the officer’s request and end the encounter.  
See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.  We thus hold that Officer 
Mulqueeney’s request for De Castro to remove his hands from 
his pockets did not constitute a seizure. 
 Holdings of our sister circuits finding a seizure when 
officers made similar requests are distinguishable.  For 
example, an officer’s request for an individual to remove his 
hands from his pockets constituted a seizure where there were 
multiple officers present and the location was actively being 
searched for drugs when the individual arrived.  See United 
States v. Jackson, 901 F.2d 83, 83 (7th Cir. 1990).  The Seventh 
Circuit found that the request “implie[d] that [the officers] 
anticipate[d] some potential menace from [the individual],” 
and “[i]n th[ose] circumstances he would be foolhardy to try to 
leave.”  Id. at 84.  See also United States v. Camacho, 661 F.3d 
718, 729 (1st Cir. 2011) (finding a “substantial show of 
authority” when officers “cut[] off [two individuals’] path with 
an unmarked police car, order[ed] [the first individual] to put 
his hands on the hood, ask[ed] [the second individual] 
‘accusatory’ questions, and order[ed] [him] to take his hands 
out of his pockets”).  Indeed, we have ruled similarly in this 
regard.  See, e.g., United States v. Lowe, 791 F.3d 424, 431-32 
(3d Cir. 2015) (finding that officers approaching an individual 
“in a hurried manner” and with a firearm drawn displayed a 
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show of authority when they made five to ten requests for the 
individual to show his hands).  A seizure has also been 
recognized when an individual ignored an officer’s first 
request for him to remove his hands from his pockets, causing 
the officer to “repeat[] the question in an increasingly loud 
voice a few more times . . . .”  United States v. Dubose, 579 
F.3d 117, 119 (1st Cir. 2009).   
Here, by way of contrast, there was no similar show of 
authority or intimidating conduct on the part of Officer 
Mulqueeney.  He was alone.  He did not brandish a firearm.  
He spoke in a conversational tone.  De Castro voluntarily 
removed his hands from his pockets, thereby revealing a 
weapon that furnished Officer Mulqueeney with the necessary 
reasonable suspicion to seize the gun.  Accordingly, the 
District Court did not err in denying De Castro’s suppression 
motion. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of conviction entered on April 12, 2017. 
